March 16, 1982
Upon examination, the ``unilateral moratorium'' offered by President Brezhnev is neither
unilateral, nor a moratorium.
The offer, President Brezhnev makes clear, is limited to the European Soviet Union, thus leaving
the U.S.S.R. free to continue its SS - 20 buildup east of the Urals, well within range of Western
Europe. As we have noted on many occasions, given its range and mobility, an SS - 20 is a threat
to NATO wherever located.
President Brezhnev clearly links his ``unilateral'' offer to the condition that Western preparations
for the deployment of ground launch cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II's, agreed upon in
December 1979, do not proceed. This condition, plus the fact that the Soviets have already
prepared sites for new SS - 20's west as well as east of the Urals, demonstrate that this is a
propaganda gesture and that the Soviets do not really intend to stop their SS - 20 buildup.
The Soviet SS - 20 force already exceeds the dimensions of the expected threat when NATO took
its decision of December 1979 to deploy U.S. GLCM and Pershing II missiles in Europe and to
seek, through arms control, to reduce planned levels of long-range intermediate nuclear force
(INF) missiles on both sides. The Soviets now have 300 SS - 20 missiles deployed, with 900
warheads. Brezhnev's freeze proposal is designed, like previous Soviet statements over the past 3
years, to direct attention away from the enormous growth of Soviet capabilities that has already
taken place and the enormous preponderance that the Soviet Union has thereby acquired.
It is unfortunate that the Soviets did not choose to exercise real restraint before their SS - 20
buildup began. NATO, for its part, has been observing restraint on INF missiles for well over a
decade, which the Soviets simply exploited.
In sum, President Brezhnev's offer is neither evidence of Soviet restraint, nor is it designed to
foster an arms control agreement. Like previous such Soviet freeze proposals, this one seeks to
legitimize Soviet superiority, to leave the Soviet Union free to continue its buildup, to divide the
NATO Alliance, to stop U.S. deployments, and thus to secure for the Soviet Union unchallenged
hegemony over Europe.
The United States has put forward concrete proposals in Geneva for the complete elimination of
missiles on both sides, cited by Brezhnev in his remarks of today. We regret the Soviet Union
apparently prefers propaganda gestures to concentrating on serious negotiations in Geneva. For
its part, the United States, with the full support of its allies, will continue to implement both tracks
of the December 1979 decision on the deployment of new systems to Europe and the pursuit of
genuine arms control, which we hope will make those deployments unnecessary.
President Brezhnev's proposal to place limits on the operations of missiles submarines is also not a
serious proposal. U.S submarines, by deploying to extensive ocean areas, are able to remain
invulnerable to Soviet attack, and thus constitute a stable deterrent force. Reducing their area of
operations in the world's oceans would increase their vulnerability and erode our confidence in
their deterrent capability. The Soviet proposal, therefore, is entirely self-serving. Having made a
large fraction of our land-based ICBM force vulnerable through their large ICBM buildup, the
Soviets in this proposal are attempting to reduce the confidence we have in the sea-based leg of
our deterrent.
The proposal for a ban on the deployment of ground-based, long-range cruise missiles is yet
another transparent effort to disrupt NATO's 1979 two-track decision. Moreover, in focusing on
sea-based as well as land-based, long-range cruise missiles, the proposal ignores the hundreds of
shorter range cruise missiles that the Soviet Union currently deploys aboard its warships.
Finally, we want to reiterate the four principles underlying the Reagan administration's approach
to arms control. These are to seek agreements that:
1. produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
2. are equal, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage
coercion or aggression;
3. are verifiable, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based
simply upon trust; and
4. enhance U.S. and Allied security, because arms control is not an end in itself, but an important
means toward securing peace and international stability.
These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They
underlie our position in the current Geneva negotiations on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet
intermediate-range nuclear missile forces. They also form the basis for our approach to
negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of strategic arms -- the START talks.