June 8, 1983
Good morning.
The strategic arms talks, or START, as we have named it, officially resumed today in Geneva, and
I would like to speak for a moment about my hopes for these important negotiations and about
changes which I've decided to make in our START proposal. Such changes reflect concerns and
recommendations of the Scowcroft commission, the Congress, and others. They offer the
prospect of new progress toward a START agreement.
Before discussing these specifics, I would like to comment on what I see as very positive
developments taking place both here and abroad.
I'm happy to say that today there's a growing sense that we're making progress. I just met in
Williamsburg, as you perhaps have heard, with the leaders of the major industrialized nations, and
I was struck there not only by the facts and figures pointing toward economic recovery but also
by a spirit of optimism and cooperation which was remarkable. This same spirit is visible in our
discussion on security issues.
In NATO, as in other alliances, there's a new feeling of partnership. The Atlantic alliance is alive
and well, and its close consultations are a source of strength and participation for each of its
members. At least as important, and very gratifying to me, is the new spirit of bipartisanship on
national security issues which is increasingly evident in both Houses of Congress.
When I established the Scowcroft commission, I could not then foresee the impact that this
outstanding panel would have. Clearly, the Commission's work, which went beyond MX to
address critical issues of deterrence and arms control, has become a major stimulus to the
rethinking of national policy. The Commission's report challenged some favorite assumptions and
called for changes in our strategic planning. At the same time, it expressed support for my
administration's most heartfelt objectives in arms control -- deep reductions, modernization for
stability's sake, and the elimination of the first-strike threat.
I have pledged to Congress my full support for the Scowcroft commission recommendations and
my intention to incorporate them in our START proposal. So that we can continue to benefit
from the wisdom of its counsel, I intend to ask the Commission to continue to serve. Its bipartisan
membership will thus be able to provide timely advice to me, both with respect to the adoption of
its proposals into our defense program, and our arms control policies.
In recent weeks, I and officials of my administration have had an extensive series of private
meetings with many Members of Congress. We've reviewed implications for the START
negotiations of the Scowcroft commission recommendations and also of the mutual guaranteed
build-down advocated by a number of distinguished Members of the Congress. The review of our
START position was capped by four recent meetings, three yesterday and one today.
Yesterday morning at a meeting of the National Security Council, my senior advisers and I
reviewed major implications and options. We also considered a range of congressional
viewpoints. Yesterday afternoon I met with groups of Senators and Congressmen whose interest
and expertise in arms control I value highly. I discussed with them the major issues before us. And
this morning, I met with the leadership of both Houses of the Congress. And throughout the
START negotiations, the administration has consulted with our allies.
Three full rounds of negotiations of START are now behind us. It's my judgment that these
rounds have been useful and have permitted us to cover necessary ground. However, due largely
to Soviet intransigence, we have not yet made meaningful progress on the central issues. I remain
firmly committed to take whatever steps are necessary to increase the likelihood of real,
substantive progress toward an agreement involving significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenals and in the national security interests of both sides.
Above all, our goal is to maintain a stable nuclear balance in order to reduce the risk of war. Our
efforts in the START negotiations must be guided by that objective.
The report of the Scowcroft commission offers us a new opportunity for progress. It has provided
a consistent and coherent framework to guide our thinking about the fundamental elements of our
national security policy -- deterrence, defense, and arms control. But more than that, it has
provided the basis for renewed, bipartisan support for that policy.
To capitalize on this critical opportunity and on the basis of the widest possible range of advice, I
have directed new steps toward progress in achieving real arms reductions at the START
negotiations. The purpose of this guidance, provided to Ambassador Ed Rowny, our Chief
START Negotiator, is to adjust the U.S. START position to bring it into line with the Scowcroft
commission's recommendations and to provide additional flexibility to our negotiators in pursuing
our basic goals.
Although we have put forth a comprehensive proposal on limiting strategic ballistic missiles and
bombers, our primary aim in the START negotiations has been, and continues to be, to reduce the
threat posed by the most destabilizing systems, namely ballistic missiles. To achieve that aim,
measures that constrain the number and destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile
warheads are essential. Our proposed limit of 5,000 total ballistic missile warheads -- a reduction
by one-third of the current level -- remains the central element of the U.S. START position.
The U.S. START position tabled in previous negotiating rounds includes another constraint. It
would have limited each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was
never viewed as being as useful or important a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile
warheads. The Scowcroft commission report specifically suggested that it should be reassessed,
since it could constrain the evolution we seek towards small, single-warhead ICBM's. Acting
upon the Commission's recommendation, I have now directed our negotiators to adjust our
position on deployed ballistic missiles by relaxing our current proposal for an 850 deployed
ballistic missile limit.
At the same time, the United States remains firm on the point that the destructive capability and
potential of ballistic missiles must be addressed in START. Our current position includes a
network of constraints designed to lead toward a more stable strategic balance at reduced force
levels while addressing the destructive potential of missiles.
The Soviets and others have complained that these constraints are designed to dictate Soviet force
structure according to U.S. standards. This is not the case. We believe, as does the Scowcroft
commission, that ability -- or stability -- can be increased by limitations on the destructive
capability and potential of ballistic missiles. As a consequence, we will continue to propose such
constraints which indirectly get to the throw-weight problem, while making clear to the Soviets
our readiness to deal directly with the corresponding destructive capability, if they prefer.
There may be more than one way to achieve our objective of greater stability at reduced levels of
arms. So, I've instructed Ambassador Rowny to make clear to the Soviet delegation our
commitment to our fundamental objectives, but I have also given him the flexibility to explore all
appropriate avenues for meeting our goals. I sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will respond
with corresponding flexibility.
Finally, high priority work is continuing on how the mutual and guaranteed build-down concept
proposed by several United States Senators can be applied in our quest for significant and
stabilizing strategic arms reductions.
These actions reflect a bipartisan consensus on arms control and new flexibility in the negotiations
-- steps to be viewed by the Soviets and all others who have a stake in world peace. To the
leaders of the Soviet Union, I urge that this new opportunity not be lost. To America's friends and
allies around the world, I say that your steadfast support for the goals of both deterrence and arms
control is essential in the future. To Congress and to the American people, I say let us continue to
work together in a bipartisan spirit so that these days will be spoken of in the future as the time
when America turned a corner. Let us put our differences behind us. Let us demonstrate measured
flexibility in our approach, while remaining strong in our determination to reach our objectives of
arms reduction, stability, and security. Let us be leaders in the cause of peace.
Thank you.
Note: The President spoke at 11:02 a.m. in the Rose Garden at the White House.