April 9, 1984
On January 3, 1983, I established a bipartisan Commission to examine issues raised by the
Congress concerning the strategic modernization program, especially the Peacekeeper (MX)
missile. On April 19, 1983, I was very pleased to report to the Congress and the American people
that the Commission unanimously agreed on strategic force modernization recommendations,
which I strongly endorsed. Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council also
endorsed the recommendations of the Commission. At that time, I affirmed my commitment to
pursue ambitious arms reduction negotiations as an integral part of the package.
Despite the range of views which existed in the past, the Congress joined us in supporting this
bipartisan effort to modernize our strategic deterrent. This consensus was a major
accomplishment in our common effort to enhance national security. The willingness of all parties
to reexamine their previous positions allowed us to end a decade of political paralysis over arms
control and modernization.
Last week the Commission issued its final report. The report focuses on the arms control portion
of its earlier recommendations. Once again, the Commission members and their counselors have
performed a tough job extraordinarily well. Again, we all owe this distinguished group of
Americans special thanks.
This final report reiterates the original recommendations, that is, an integrated strategic program
consisting of an arms control structure with incentives to enhance stability at reduced levels of
strategic arsenals; deployment of 100 MX missiles; and development of a small, single warhead
ICBM; as well as other elements. The Commission again emphasizes that each element is essential
to the overall program it outlined.
After noting the disappointing history of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, the Commission
emphasizes the importance of keeping expectations within bounds. In particular, arms control can
make a substantial contribution to U.S. security by increasing strategic stability, allowing some
types of defense expenditures to be avoided, and offering a useful forum for dialog on strategic
concepts and priorities. The Commission stresses, however, that arms control alone cannot end
the threat of nuclear war, reduce the casualties and damage in the event of such a war, or
automatically permit deep or early defense budget cuts.
On related issues, the Commission confirms the need for effective verification and satisfactory
compliance to sustain the arms control process. The Commission recognizes the significance of
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and notes that research permitted under the treaty is
important to ascertain realistic, technological possibilities as well as to guard against Soviet ABM
breakout. The Commission also recommends extreme caution in proceeding to engineering
development of an active strategic defense system.
Our proposed strategic defense initiative is limited to technology research. The initiative also
includes continued study of strategic policy and arms control implications of strategic defense
concepts. The program is consistent with all treaty obligations and there is no conflict between
our initiative and the recommendations made by the Commission.
Finally, the Commission notes the importance of measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and
makes clear the serious flaws of a nuclear freeze.
I am pleased to announce that I, along with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National
Security Council, strongly endorse the Commission's final report.
I urge continuing support by the Congress and the American people for this bipartisan consensus
which unites us in our common objective of strengthening our national security and moving
toward significant reductions in nuclear arms.