Letter to Congressional
Leaders Transmitting a Report on
Dear
Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) (Dear Mr. Chairman:)
Enclosed
is an unclassified version of a classified report which I provided on June 19
in response to related Congressional requests, including a request for
projections and comparisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic force dismantlements, inventories, etc., in terms of adherence to
existing arms control agreements.
As
I noted in my letter of June 19 transmitting the classified report, it is clear
that SALT II and I codified a very major arms buildup including a quadrupling
of Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and bombs) since SALT I was signed in
1972 and near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile warheads from about 5,000 to
more than 9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979.
The
report further found that the SALT I and II agreements, even if fully complied
with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet
capabilities. We believe that, absent SALT II, the Soviets would not
necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases already projected
with SALT II since the Soviet forces are very large and would appear, in our
judgment, more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements.
In
my letter of June 19, I noted that in view of the adverse implications of
Soviet noncompliance for our security and for the arms control process, I had
determined on May 27 that, in the future, the United States must base decisions
regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the
threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the
SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and
especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have
expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.
I
have also noted that the full implementation of the Strategic Modernization
Program is critical both to meeting our future national security needs and to
appropriately responding to Soviet noncompliance. However, we will exercise
utmost restraint. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as
national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable
growth in the size of
I
want again to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for
an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms,
provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such
reductions continues to receive my highest priority. This is the most direct
path to achieving greater stability and a safer world.
Sincerely,
Ronald
Reagan
Note: Identical letters were
sent to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives; George
Bush, President of the Senate; Barry Goldwater, chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee; and Les Aspin, chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee.