Message to the Congress
Transmitting a Study on Soviet-United States Nuclear Testing Cooperation
To
the Congress of the
In
response to the requirements of Section 1003 of the FY 1986 Department of
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 99 - 145), I am pleased to transmit this unclassified
interagency study of possible avenues of cooperation between the United States
and the Soviet Union in the development of verification capabilities consistent
with national security restrictions.
The
requirement under Section 1003 involves: ``limited exchanges of data and
scientific personnel,'' in general, and ``joint technological effort in the
area of seismic monitoring,'' in particular. Upon review of a number of
possible scientific disciplines, it was concluded that in terms of this study, nuclear
testing issues appear to offer the most promising avenues for such
``scientific'' cooperation and data exchange. Therefore, the attached study
focuses its examination on matters relating to the verification of limitations
in nuclear testing.
While
the attached study focuses on nuclear testing limitations, it should be noted
that in other arms control areas as well, the Administration believes that
exchanges of information would, in addition to various monitoring provisions
including types of on-site inspections, play an important role in establishing
a verification framework.
In
START and INF, for example, areas of possible exchange of information might
include the declaration of missile and launcher facilities, the numbers of
missiles and launchers at such facilities, and information on the destruction
of missiles and launchers that are in excess of agreed treaty limits. In the
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), we have asked for
an exchange of information, to be updated annually, on the structure of forces
subject to MBFR limitations. At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures in Europe (CDE), we believe it important to have an
exchange of information both on overall force structures and on specific forces
participating in military activities. In chemical weapons arms control, we
believe it important, among other things, to have a preliminary bilateral
exchange of data on chemical weapons stockpiles and on production facilities as
a confidence-building measure prior to the entry into force of a convention
banning such weapons.
The
prospects for progress in arms control may be significantly enhanced if a
regime of cooperation between the
As
indicated in the attached study, the
This
meeting of experts, which took place in
Ronald
Reagan
The
White House,