Message to the Congress Transmitting a Study on Soviet-United States Nuclear Testing Cooperation
the Congress of the
In response to the requirements of Section 1003 of the FY 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 99 - 145), I am pleased to transmit this unclassified interagency study of possible avenues of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of verification capabilities consistent with national security restrictions.
The requirement under Section 1003 involves: ``limited exchanges of data and scientific personnel,'' in general, and ``joint technological effort in the area of seismic monitoring,'' in particular. Upon review of a number of possible scientific disciplines, it was concluded that in terms of this study, nuclear testing issues appear to offer the most promising avenues for such ``scientific'' cooperation and data exchange. Therefore, the attached study focuses its examination on matters relating to the verification of limitations in nuclear testing.
While the attached study focuses on nuclear testing limitations, it should be noted that in other arms control areas as well, the Administration believes that exchanges of information would, in addition to various monitoring provisions including types of on-site inspections, play an important role in establishing a verification framework.
In START and INF, for example, areas of possible exchange of information might include the declaration of missile and launcher facilities, the numbers of missiles and launchers at such facilities, and information on the destruction of missiles and launchers that are in excess of agreed treaty limits. In the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), we have asked for an exchange of information, to be updated annually, on the structure of forces subject to MBFR limitations. At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe (CDE), we believe it important to have an exchange of information both on overall force structures and on specific forces participating in military activities. In chemical weapons arms control, we believe it important, among other things, to have a preliminary bilateral exchange of data on chemical weapons stockpiles and on production facilities as a confidence-building measure prior to the entry into force of a convention banning such weapons.
prospects for progress in arms control may be significantly enhanced if a
regime of cooperation between the
indicated in the attached study, the
meeting of experts, which took place in
The White House,