Letter to House Majority
Leader Jim Wright on Arms Control and the Meeting With
Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in
Dear
Mr. Leader:
Thank
you for taking time from your busy schedule to join me for breakfast yesterday
and for the opportunity to discuss my upcoming meeting in
It
is on the subject of the omnibus appropriations bill and its relation to the
Unfortunately,
merely wishing for these goals will not allow us to attain them. We have before
us a genuine opportunity to advance the prospects for true arms reduction, for
progress on human rights, for addressing regional conflicts, and for building
on our bilateral relationship. I believe this opportunity results from the
resolve shown not just by this Administration but by the Congress and most
importantly by the American people.
The
American people understand that the Soviets will negotiate only when it is in
their interest to do so and when they believe they will do better at the
negotiating table than they will do through a continued arms buildup.
I
want to address your suggestions on how we might reach final agreement on the
Continuing Resolution. If I understood your approach, it was to seek compromise
where possible on the outstanding differences of ASAT, chemical weapons, and
SDI, but to put off decisions until next March on a moratorium on nuclear
testing and adherence to the SALT II sublimits. In
addition, you would require my commitment, in the interim, to adhere to the
SALT II limitations.
You
mentioned that, as Majority Leader, you were being an honest representative of
the views of your Democratic colleagues and I respect the spirit
in which you offered those thoughts. Nonetheless, I believe this approach would
harm the prospects for success at
The
Soviet leaders are very intelligent and skilled negotiators. The Soviets are
careful observers of our political and legislative process. They are watching
intently what decisions our government makes on issues critical to them in
deciding how they should approach our meetings this weekend. Our system does
not mask our differences or our debate -- a tradition of debate that is the
foundation of strength in an open and free democratic society.
For
five and a half years that system has demonstrated a commitment to peace
achieved through a position of strength.
Specifically,
the actions taken by the Congress in dealing with the Continuing Resolution
will send a signal for all to see. Will we go forward maintaining our resolve
or will we begin to negotiate with ourselves, jeopardizing the good work that
has brought us to our current position? Now for the first time in history, the
Soviets are discussing seriously not just limitations on how many more weapons
we have but how we can reduce the weapons we already have.
How
can I agree to Congressional restrictions on nuclear testing before we agree
with the Soviets on adequate verification procedures to avoid cheating and
before we agree to eliminate the nuclear weapons which now make nuclear testing
necessary? How can I agree to adhere to certain limits of the unratified SALT II treaty when the Soviets have already
violated some of its provisions?
Therefore,
you should know that I believe any further delay in resolving the differences
on the Continuing Resolution beyond the commencement of the talks in
Further,
I cannot be forced by the Congress to accept language that restricts our
bargaining position at the negotiating table. We must not send a message to the
Soviets that could be construed as an incentive to delay undertaking serious
discussions now because of a belief that they could get a better deal from the
Congress later.
Finally,
it is equally important that the outstanding and unresolved domestic issues in
the Continuing Resolution also be addressed. These items are as much of an
impediment to finalizing the budget as are the national security-related
matters.
I
have instructed my staff to continue to work earnestly with the Congress to
facilitate the completion of a Continuing Resolution that I can sign. I also
want to reiterate the appeal I made to you and your colleagues yesterday.
Partisan differences on national security issues must be set aside during this
crucial time in our negotiations with the Soviets. I also want to restate my
hope that I will go to
Sincerely,
Ronald
Reagan
Note:
The original was not available for verification of the content of this letter.