Statement on Signing the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
I
have signed into law S. 2638, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1987. I am both pleased and disappointed with this act. I am pleased that
it supports a defense program that is consistent with the dollar level provided
in the congressional budget resolution for fiscal year 1987. I am disappointed, however, that the funding levels proposed in
the congressional budget resolutions for the past 3 years have decreased
continually and that even those lower levels have not been fully appropriated.
As a result, some of our significant accomplishments over the past few years in
rebuilding
I
am particularly pleased with the provisions in the act that:
-- approve 12 MX test missiles and authorize
funding to proceed with research and development on survivable basing modes;
-- authorize funds to continue research and
development on the small intercontinental ballistic missile recommended by the
Scowcroft commission;
-- approve the full amount requested for the
advanced technology bomber and the advanced cruise missile;
-- allow actual production of part of our
needed modern chemical weapons deterrent capability, 155 mm binary artillery
rounds;
-- fully fund the
request for air-defense fighter competition;
-- adopt several administrative options that
will allow the Department to reduce outlay levels in fiscal year 1987; and
-- approve construction of a Trident submarine
and fund homeporting initiatives for
I
am concerned, however, that this legislation includes:
-- a reduction of
$1.8 billion, or 34 percent, for the Strategic Defense Initiative program,
which is our path to a safer future;
-- restrictive
general provisions, including a ban on ASAT testing against objects in space
and denial of BIGEYE bomb production before
-- reductions in
procurement quantities to F - 15, F - 16, and F - 18 tactical fighter aircraft
programs; and
-- reductions in
procurement quantities of such critical programs as the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, AMRAAM, and C - 17 Transport.
I
am also extremely disappointed that the Congress saw the need to legislate the
reorganization of the Special Operations Forces, particularly in mandating the
creation of a unified command, which has heretofore been the exclusive
prerogative of the President as Commander in Chief.
With
regard to arms control, this act includes a nonbinding sense of the Congress
provision concerning continued
In
addition, there are other features of the act that trouble me. Sections 921(d)
and 1207 of the act require the Department of Defense to make efforts to expand
participation in the procurement process by small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals and to
establish a contracting goal for such concerns and for historically black
colleges and universities and certain minority institutions. I have signed this
act on the understanding that those objectives will be pursued in a
race-neutral manner, consistent with constitutional standards. These standards
require that any implementation of these provisions be premised on findings of
actual discrimination in the granting of defense contracts and be narrowly
tailored to remedy such discrimination. Thus, the Secretary's authority under
the act must be read with constitutional requirements in mind.
Section 1370 of the act calls for access by the
Secretary of Defense to all nonproliferation information that the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of Energy has or is entitled to have, with the exception
of certain intradepartmental communications. I must consider this
section to be advisory, since if it were construed otherwise, it would intrude
on my constitutional responsibilities to direct and supervise officers of the
executive branch and to control the dissemination of sensitive national
security information. The Secretary of Defense has certain statutory
responsibilities with respect to nuclear proliferation that would be served by
his receipt of appropriate nonproliferation information. The sharing of
appropriate information on nuclear nonproliferation will be resolved through
the normal interagency process in the executive branch.
Section
1404 of the act establishes the Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in
Education Foundation to award scholarships and fellowships to eligible persons
for study in the fields of science and mathematics. I welcome the participation
of Members of the House and Senate, who will constitute 4 of the 13 members of
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation. However, the doctrine of separation of
powers necessarily restricts their participation on the Board to ceremonial or
advisory functions, rather than matters involving administration, which may
only be performed by executive officers. Moreover, under the Incompatibility
Clause of the Constitution, any Member of Congress appointed to serve on the
Board of Trustees may serve only in a ceremonial or advisory capacity.
Sections
3121 and 3123 of this act purport to authorize congressional committees to
waive all or part of report-and-wait periods otherwise required with respect to
certain reprogrammings or obligations of funds. As I
have noted before, committee waiver provisions such as these do not conform to
the requirements for legislative action articulated in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), since they would authorize
committees of the Congress, without participation by both Houses of Congress
and the President, to allow the Department of Energy to implement proposed reprogrammings or obligations prior to expiration of the
otherwise required waiting period. Once again, I strongly urge the Congress to
discontinue the inclusion of such devices in legislation, because after Chadha they only introduce confusion and ambiguity into the
process by which the Executive's obligations are discharged.
Despite
the above concerns, I believe that this legislation as a whole represents a
positive step toward strengthening our national defense.
Note:
S. 2638, approved November 14, was assigned Public Law No. 99 - 661.