Joint Statement on the
Soviet-United States
Ronald
W. Reagan, President of the
Attending
the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of
State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff
Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General
Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the
President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny;
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador
of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.
Attending
on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A.
Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary
of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev;
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin;
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed
Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet
Union Sergei F. Akhromeev;
Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU
Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin;
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr
A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United
States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P.
Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.
During
the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders'
November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held
comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the
two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues,
settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were
candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the
two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not
insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.
They
reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the
whole of the relationship.
The
leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at
The
President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of
their meetings in
The
two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the
I.
Arms Control
The
INF Treaty
The
two leaders signed the Treaty between the
Nuclear
and Space Talks
The
President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in
strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been
made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent
reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in
In
so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent
reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in
the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in
Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic
offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles;
the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an
agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the
Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a
level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will
not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a
mutually satisfactory manner.
As
priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:
(a)
The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic
stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM
plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.
(b)
The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy
bomber. The Delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.
(c)
The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides
proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are
deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the
(d)
The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting
the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.
Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive
delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings
on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of
verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of
National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.
(e)
Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the
provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:
1.
Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location
of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems
are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include
locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing,
and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be
exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated
periodically after entry into force.
2.
Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after
entry into force of the Treaty.
3.
On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to
achieve the agreed limits.
4.
Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical
production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.
5.
Short-notice on-site inspection of:
(i) declared locations during the
process of reducing to agreed limits;
(ii)
locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain
after achieving the agreed limits; and
(iii)
locations where such systems have been located
(formerly declared facilities).
6.
The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice
inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment,
production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.
7.
Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede
verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban
on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric
information broadcast during missile flight.
8.
Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and
limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would
include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases,
and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.
Taking
into account the preparation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the
leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to
work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as
signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as
required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic
stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the
specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed
otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an
agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This
agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they
direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.
The
sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the
U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to
reduce the risk of nuclear war.
Other
Arms Control Issues
The
President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues
concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance
of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas
of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that
enhance security and stability.
Nuclear
Testing
The
two leaders welcomed the opening on
The
The
leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts'
visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and
subsequently to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test
site. The terms of reference for the Experiment are set forth in the statement
issued on
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
The
President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the
United States and the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since
their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty, and confirmed their
intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve
universal adherence to the Treaty.
The
President and the General Secretary expressed support for international
cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate
export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders
agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and
useful, and should continue.
Nuclear
Risk Reduction Centers
The
leaders welcomed the signing on
Chemical
Weapons
The
leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable,
comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and
destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed
the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and
verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The
Conventional
Forces
The
President and the General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of
reducing the level of military confrontation in
They
also discussed the
Follow-Up
Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
They
expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
II.
Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns
The
leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian
questions and their place in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.
III.
Regional Issues
The
President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and
businesslike discussion of regional questions, including
IV.
Bilateral Affairs
The
President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of U.S.-Soviet
bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and
strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation.
Bilateral
Negotiations
Having
reviewed the state of ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific
bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their
representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on:
commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio
navigational systems; the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary; and cooperation in the
field of transportation and other areas.
They
noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the
U.S.-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including
joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and
Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.
People-to-People
Contacts and Exchanges
The
two leaders took note of progress in implementing the U.S.-Soviet General
Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports,
signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to
eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction
with plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first Exchanges
Agreement in January 1988.
The
two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening
understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction
the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the
initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in
Global
Climate and Environmental Change Initiative
With
reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to cooperate in the
preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral
initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change
through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and
conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges
pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on
the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad
international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of
global climate and environmental change.
Cooperative
Activities
The
President and the General Secretary supported further cooperation among
scientists of the
The
two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing a permanent working group
in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to
develop further cooperation in this area.
The
President and the General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed
that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in
early 1988.
They
also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation
in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.
The
two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and
cooperation on issues relating to the
The
two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the
COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by
the
Trade
The
two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial
trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene
the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete
proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the
Long-Term Agreement between the
Diplomatic
Missions
Both
sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their
respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to
approach problems relating to the functioning of Embassies and Consulates
General constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.
V.
Further Meetings
The
President and the General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels
should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving
practical and concrete results in all areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
General
Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the